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ARTICLE 
The Carbon Tax Vacuum and the Debate 
about Climate Change Impacts: Emission 
Taxation of Commodity Crop Production in 
Food System Regulation 
GABRIELA STEIER* 
“The vulnerability of agriculture to climatic change is 
strongly dependent on the responses taken by 
humans to moderate the effects of climate change.”1 
The scientific consensus on climate change is far ahead of 
U.S. policy on point. In fact, the U.S. has a legal vacuum of car-
bon taxation while climate change continues to impact the code-
pendence of agriculture and the environment. As this Article 
shows, carbon taxes follow the polluter-pays model, levying taxes 
on the highest greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions—and contribu-
tions to climate change. But this is not only unsustainable; it 
would also undermine agricultural production and, thus, food se-
curity. This Article describes how the law can regulate climate 
change contributions and promote adaptation and mitigation 
strategies. If climate change adaptation and mitigation are not 
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University School of Law. Based in Boston, she focuses her scholarship on 
food, climate change, and animal welfare law and policy in the US and the 
EU. She has a B.A. from Tufts University, J.D. from Duquesne University 
School of Law, an LL.M. in Food and Agriculture Law from the Vermont 
Law School, and a doctorate in Comparative Law from the University of 
Cologne, Germany. She thanks all those who support her research and 
scholarship. 
1.  U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CLIMATE CHANGE AND AGRICULTURE IN THE UNITED 
STATES: EFFECTS AND ADAPTATIONS 1–2 (2013), https://perma.cc/5HWN-
DU2B. 
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supported through carbon taxes in the agricultural sector, twenty 
percent of GHG contributions will be left untouched, jeopardizing 
the future of U.S. food production at the environment’s expense. 
This Article reveals new avenues of climate change adaptation 
and mitigation through carbon taxation of genetically modified 
(“GMO”) commodity crops to bring the carbon tax to a previously 
overlooked contributor to climate change: intensive agriculture. 
However, adapting to and mitigating the effects of climate change, 
such as extreme weather events, droughts, and floods, can only be 
accomplished through concerted efforts of various industries, gov-
ernments, and the public like cap-and-trade or carbon tax schemes 
imposing blanket limits on GHG emissions.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Climate change has been a much-debated issue of our time. 
At the core of this debate lies the question of how the law can 
regulate climate change contributions and promote adaptation 
and mitigation strategies. The United Nations (“UN”), the Euro-
pean Union (“EU”), the United States, and intergovernmental or-
ganizations have been focusing on the policy aspects of climate 
change for decades while environmentalists, industrialists, and 
non-profit organizations have created precedent through litiga-
tion. The most important function of climate change law and poli-
cy, however, is to curb the global emissions of greenhouse gases 
(“GHGs”) that trap heat in the Earth’s atmosphere and warm 
climates. However, adapting to and mitigating the effects of cli-
mate change, such as extreme weather events, droughts, and 
floods, can only be accomplished through concerted efforts of vari-
ous industries, governments, and the public like cap-and-trade or 
carbon tax schemes imposing blanket limits on GHG emissions. 
This Article reveals new avenues of climate change adaptation 
and mitigation through carbon taxation of genetically modified 
(“GMO”) commodity crops to bring the carbon tax to a previously 
overlooked contributor to climate change: intensive agriculture. 
At the onset, this Article describes the current state of agri-
culture and its effects on climate change. Part II summarizes the 
leading climate science and the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change’s (“IPCC”) evidence of climate change. Then, an in-
troduction to Pacala and Socolow’s “Wedges” model for climate 
change mitigation illustrates that the current business-as-usual 
food production system is unsustainable and harmful to its own 
continued existence. In the subsequent discussion about climate 
policy, the scientific rationales lay the groundwork for the follow-
ing introduction to the carbon-tax idea within the law and policy 
setting. Thus, Part III first explains what a carbon tax is and 
provides an overview of carbon taxation under the EU’s Emis-
sions Trading Scheme (“ETS”). In the same section, the lacking 
carbon tax scheme in the U.S. is contextualized with the emis-
sions reduction incentives that carbon taxation may bring. Part 
IV provides a background of the links between environmental 
law, climate change policy, and food and agriculture law to reveal 
points of action. The goal of this subsection is to lay out the juris-
dictional hierarchy governing carbon taxes and the potential legal 
3
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challenges, unfavorable precedent, or policy obstacles to imple-
menting a GMO-commodity-crop carbon tax (“GCCCT”).2 Finally, 
this Article concludes with an assessment of the chances for suc-
cess of introducing a GCCCT in the EU and in the U.S. 
II. CLIMATE CHANGE, CARBON TAXATION, AND 
AGRICULTURE 
A. Current State of the Science: The IPCC’s 
Assessment of Agriculture’s Effect on Climate 
Change 
On an international level, the IPCC has been studying and 
publishing strong evidence of climate change.3 In periodic reports 
and environmental assessments, the IPCC provides guiding in-
formation on which the UN and governments around the globe re-
ly. Recently, an IPCC Report highlights the impact climate 
change has had on agriculture,4 pinpointing the most commonly 
traded crops—often GMOs.5 Specifically, the report states that 
“[c]limate change has negatively affected wheat and maize yields 
for many regions and in the global aggregate (medium confi-
dence). Effects on rice and soybean yield have been smaller in ma-
jor production regions and globally . . . .”6 The responses to these 
yield losses are increased uses of genetically engineered crops to 
withstand higher levels of pesticides and herbicides and to thrive 
 
2.  Carbon dioxide (“CO2”) is a particularly troublesome GHG, warranting 
special treatment. See Climate Change Indicators: U.S. Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, EPA, https://perma.cc/NA7R-B9B7 (last updated Dec. 17, 2016). 
CO2 is also a “GHG indicator”; it is often used as a representative of all 
GHGs. Id.  
3.  See, e.g., Fifth Assessment Report, IPCC, https://perma.cc/6S4E-GX6H.  
4.  IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY: 
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, in WORKING GROUP II CONTRIBUTION TO THE 
FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC 4 (2014), https://perma.cc/X23U-
M7J2 [hereinafter IPCC REPORT]. 
5.  Gabriela Steier, A Window of Opportunity for GMO Regulation: Achieving 
Food Integrity Through Cap-and-Trade Models from Climate Policy for 
GMO Regulation, 34 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 294 (2017).  
6. IPCC REPORT, supra note 4, at 5. The term “medium confidence” refers to 
the IPCC authors’ judgment about the validity of that finding given the 
available evidence and the authors’ degree of agreement with one another. 
See IPCC, GUIDANCE NOTE FOR LEAD AUTHORS OF THE IPCC FIFTH 
ASSESSMENT REPORT ON CONSISTENT TREATMENT OF UNCERTAINTIES 3 
(2010), https://perma.cc/5BGP-H4WZ.  
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/5
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on synthetic fertilizers—all of which aggravate environmental 
degradation and contribute to climate change,7 thereby fueling a 
vicious cycle. Breaking this cycle would mean discouraging the 
use of GMOs and switching to more environmentally friendly 
farming practices, even those which reduce the effects of, or help 
agriculture adapt to, climate change. As the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the UN (“FAO”) acknowledges, the global agricul-
tural sector must “adopt more efficient and sustainable produc-
tion methods and adapt to climate change.”8 The following section 
explores how such mitigation and adaption fits within legal 
frameworks. 
The IPCC Report states that “[c]limate change is projected to 
progressively increase inter-annual variability of crop yields in 
many regions[, and] [t]hese projected impacts will occur in the 
context of rapidly rising crop demand.”9 This means that climate 
change will threaten food security worldwide and could aggravate 
global hunger. According to the IPCC: 
All aspects of food security are potentially affected by climate 
change, including food access, utilization, and price stability 
(high confidence). Redistribution of marine fisheries catch poten-
tial towards higher latitudes poses risk of reduced supplies, in-
come, and employment in tropical countries, with potential impli-
cations for food security (medium confidence). Global 
temperature increases of ~4°C or more above late-20th-century 
levels, combined with increasing food demand, would pose large 
risks to food security globally and regionally (high confidence).10 
Therefore, adaptation and mitigation strategies are urgently 
needed to avoid global food crises. Correspondingly, the IPCC de-
fines adaption as “[t]he process of adjustment to actual or ex-
pected climate and its effects. In human systems, [such as agri-
culture,] adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit 
beneficial opportunities.”11 It follows that, “[i]n some natural sys-
tems,” herein defined as the ecosystems that support local agri-
 
7. MARY J. ANGELO ET AL., FOOD, AGRICULTURE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 120 
(2013). 
8.   FAO, GLOBAL AGRICULTURE TOWARDS 2050 1 (2009), 
https://perma.cc/6EWM-2E78.  
9.  IPCC REPORT, supra note 4, at 18. 
10.  Id. For a discussion of the definition of “high confidence,” see supra note 6. 
11.  Id. at 5. 
5
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culture, “human intervention may facilitate adjustment to ex-
pected climate and its effects.”12 Notably, climate change impacts 
are defined as the “[e]ffects on natural and human systems.”13 In 
the IPCC Report, climate change impacts “generally refer to ef-
fects on lives, livelihoods, health, ecosystems, economies, socie-
ties, cultures, services, and infrastructure due to the interaction 
of climate changes or hazardous climate events occurring within a 
specific time period and the vulnerability of an exposed society or 
system.”14 Thus, given the pervasiveness of agriculture’s effects 
in all these areas of life, reducing agriculture’s GHG emissions 
may have promising effects on climate change adaptation and 
mitigation. 
Strategies to curb unsustainable farming practices—such as 
those that rely on heavy fossil fuel uses for transportation, tillage, 
or fertilizer production—present one of many avenues to reduce 
agriculture’s effects on climate change. Although general exam-
ples of climate change adaptation and mitigation include soil 
health conservation in human systems and wildlife protection in 
natural systems, agroecologic approaches to food production may 
unite but decentralize systems,15 thereby encouraging climate-
friendly farming that suits the world’s localities. Other examples 
of alleged adaptation and mitigation (but which are neither in re-
ality)—often set forth by biased representatives and publications 
or advertisements of the industry producing GMO-based pro-
cessed foods—include increased yield through genetic engineer-
ing, higher use of fertilizer and pesticides, and more aggressive 
farming practices, all of which are profit-oriented goals.16 This is 
sometimes referred to as the “BigAg” scheme. In the agricultural 
sector, however, despite the wide acceptance of the BigAg scheme, 
the agroecologic strategy is more promising in the long run.17 
Specifically, reducing GHG sources may be accomplished by de-
 
12.  Id. 
13.  Id. 
14.  Id. 
15.  USDA, CLIMATE CHANGE AND AGRICULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES: EFFECTS 
AND ADAPTATION 2 (2013), https://perma.cc/RJ5H-ZBEY. 
16.  ANGELO ET AL., supra note 7, at 128. 
17.  U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, The Role of the Inter-
national Economy: Our Common Future, From One Earth to One World, 
78, U.N. Doc. A/42/427, annex I (March 20, 1987), https://perma.cc/V6GE-
28VX. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/5
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centralizing food systems, which would cut emissions from indus-
trial production, processing, and distribution.18 Simultaneously, 
carbon sinks may be enhanced through increased crop diversifica-
tion, soil health management, and ocean conservation in the aq-
uaculture subsector.19 Thus, encouraging agroecologic farming 
practices inadvertently means that unsustainable farming prac-
tices following BigAg’s scheme must be discouraged. Accomplish-
ing these positive changes in the agricultural sector will take var-
ious strategies. This Article presents one approach: borrowing the 
carbon taxation method of addressing climate change to the agri-
cultural sector to introduce the polluter-pays model to food pro-
duction. 
B. Business-As-Usual: Pacala and Socolow’s Wedges 
To adapt to—and mitigate—climate change, we must recog-
nize that the business-as-usual, intensive agricultural model, 
which is still heavily reliant on BigAg-style centralization and in-
dustrialization, remains unsustainable. In fact, BigAg’s model is 
undermining its own existence through resource exploitation and 
environmental degradation for short-term profit—and at the cost 
of long-term sustainability. This model is, however, the widely-
established business-as-usual, which fails to mitigate climate 
change from the food and agriculture standpoint. Thus, clarifying 
the “current literature about stabilizing atmospheric [carbon di-
oxide] (“CO2”) at less than a doubling of the preindustrial concen-
tration has led to needless confusion about current options for 
mitigation”20 and can be explained differently than through the 
BigAg scheme and its biased publicity. In their seminal work, 
climate scientists Pacala and Socolow use wedges to idealize the 
fifty-year emissions reductions as a triangle, with a “flat” trajec-
tory of fossil fuel emissions representing “stabilization” and a ris-
ing, straight “ramp” indicating business-as-usual (“BAU”). These 
 
18.  USDA, supra note 15, at 10. 
19.  Food & Agric. Org. [FAO], APFIC/FAO Reg’l Consultative Workshop, Im-
plications of Climate Change on Fisheries and Aquaculture: Challenges for 
Adaptation and Mitigation in the Asia-Pacific Region, at 40, RAP Doc. 
2011/17 (May 2011), https://perma.cc/B5KY-2PB9.  
20.  Stephen W. Pacala & Robert H. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the 
Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 
SCIENCE 968, 968 (2004).  
7
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lines form the “stabilization triangle,” which removes exactly one-
third of BAU emissions21 (see Figure 1). The stabilization triangle 
is subdivided into seven equal wedges to “keep the focus on tech-
nologies that have the potential to produce a material difference 
by 2054.”22 As such, each “wedge represents an activity that re-
duces emissions to the atmosphere that starts at zero today and 
increases linearly. . . [and] thus represents a cumulative total of 
25 GtC of reduced emissions over 50 years.”23 According to Pacala 
and Socolow’s model, “[s]tabilization at any level requires that net 
emissions do not simply remain constant, but eventually drop to 
zero.”24 This drop represents the path toward sustainability. 
Applied to agriculture, the resource-intensive BAU would fail 
at stabilization “[w]hen forest or natural grassland is converted to 
cropland, up to one-half of the soil carbon is lost, primarily be-
cause annual tilling increases the rate of decomposition by aerat-
ing undecomposed organic matter.”25 Thus, “[a]bout . . . two 
wedges’ worth . . . has been lost historically in this way.”26 None-
theless, Pacala and Socolow provide an option that focuses on ag-
ricultural soils management,27 which illustrates how stabilization 
in the agricultural sector could be accomplished through conser-
vation tillage—when “seeds are drilled into the soil without plow-
ing” or with “the use of cover crops, and erosion control.”28 Thus, 
“a good case could be made for the IPCC’s estimate that an addi-
tional half to one wedge could be stored in this way.”29 
Notably, “this way” implies a set of sustainability- and envi-
ronmental-conservation-oriented farming methods akin to agroe-
cology—i.e., those in harmony with ecosystem conservation.30 
Conversely, stabilization, as illustrated through the wedges, 
 
21.  Id. 
22.  Id. 
23.  Id. 
24.  Id. 
25.  Id. at 971. 
26.  Id. 
27.  Id.  
28.  Id.  
29.  Id.  
30.  See generally Charles A. Francis et al., Agroecology: The Ecology of Food 
Systems, 22 J. SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. 99 (2003) (discussing the ecology of food 
systems and the framework around which education and research should 
be structured regarding the global food system). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/5
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would inevitably signify abandoning the farming methods that 
have destabilized at least two wedges’ worth, as previously ex-
plained. Thus, following the BigAg scheme, i.e., the BAU model, 
is the exact opposite of what is needed to mitigate and adapt to 
climate change—which is necessary to ensure food safety31 for the 
future; without steady agricultural yields in the face of changing 
climate, food security is, in fact, jeopardized.32 In sum, a reduc-
tion in fossil-fuel-reliant farming is necessary to achieve the sta-
bilization that food systems rely on to ensure continued food safe-
ty. 
 
Figure 1 – Pacala and Socolow’s Wedges33 
  
(A) The top curve is a repre-
sentative BAU emissions path 
for global carbon emissions as 
CO2 from fossil fuel combus-
tion and cement manufac-
ture. . . . The area between the 
two curves represents the 
avoided carbon emissions re-
quired for stabilization. 
(B) Idealization of (A): A stabi-
lization triangle of avoided 
emissions (green) and allowed 
emissions (blue). The allowed 
emissions are fixed at 7 
GtC/year beginning in 2004. 
The stabilization triangle is 
divided into seven wedges, 
each of which reaches 1 
GtC/year in 2054. With linear growth, the total avoided emissions 
 
31.  Food Safety, in FAO, FOOD AND NUTRITION: A HANDBOOK FOR NAMIBIAN 
VOLUNTEER LEADERS, (2004) http://perma.cc/4YYH-EZ4Y (Food safety, for 
purposes of this Article, shall follow the UN FAO definition of focusing on 
“handling, storing and preparing food to prevent infection and help to 
make sure that . . . food keeps enough nutrients for . . . a healthy diet.” 
Id.).   
32.  U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, supra note 17, at 82. 
33.  Pacala & Socolow, supra note 20, at 968–72. 
9
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per wedge is 25 GtC, and the total area of the stabilization trian-
gle is 175 GtC. The arrow at the bottom right of the stabilization 
triangle points downward to emphasize that fossil fuel emissions 
must decline substantially below 7 GtC/year after 2054 to achieve 
stabilization at 500 ppm. 
Pacala and Socolow are hopeful that “[h]umanity can solve 
the carbon and climate problem in the first half of this century 
simply by scaling up what we already know how to do.”34 While 
agroecology provides many of the answers, consumers are em-
powered to be climate-active citizens.35 Thus, implementing agri-
cultural policies to stabilize emissions “would inevitably be rene-
gotiated periodically to take into account the results of research 
and development, experience with specific wedges, and revised 
estimates of the size of the stabilization triangle. But not filling 
the stabilization triangle will put 500-ppm stabilization out of 
reach.”36 
Consequently, governments are starting to respond with poli-
cy models that mandate certain GHG reductions to fill the stabi-
lization triangle, even if these connections are not necessarily ex-
plicit. The following section focuses on carbon taxation as a policy 
response that may help to reach stabilization goals while further 
specifying climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies 
for the agricultural sector. 
III. CARBON TAXING FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 
ADAPTATION AND MITIGATION 
A. What is a Carbon Tax? 
By definition, “[a] ‘carbon tax’ or a tax on GHG emissions im-
poses a direct fee (the carbon price) on emission sources based on 
the amount of GHG they emit, but does not set a limit on GHG 
 
34.  Id. at 968. 
35.  See Jan C. Semenza et al., Public Perception of Climate Change: Voluntary 
Mitigation and Barriers to Behavior Change, 35 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 
479, 483 (2008) (discussing changes in individual behavior in response to 
knowledge of human-induced climate change).  
36.  Pacala & Socolow, supra note 20, at 968. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/5
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emissions.”37 As such, a carbon tax resembles cap-and-trade op-
tions in that “the tax could be imposed upstream or down-
stream”38 and essentially follows a polluter-pays model. Notably, 
under such a model, those who emit the most GHG pay the most. 
While this shifts the responsibility for polluting to the actual cul-
prits, seemingly removing the burden from the population at 
large, the carbon tax may be reflected in the prices of commodi-
ties and merely spreads the tax widely, rather than forces com-
pliance with emissions caps. Nonetheless, such a carbon tax may 
“require importers, producers and distributors of fossil fuels to 
pay a fixed fee on the carbon dioxide contained in fuel sold and/or 
it could require emitters to pay based on their actual emissions,” 
thereby enforcing improved transparency by virtue of disclosing 
measurable emissions.39 
Carbon taxes offer a host of benefits that complement cap-
and-trade alternatives.40 In fact, “[a]nalyses have shown that an 
emission tax is more likely to allow for adoption of the cheapest 
mitigation strategies, as well as easier administration, than a 
cap-and-trade scheme.41 Additionally, the revenue generation 
from carbon taxes may be reinvested in environmental cleanup 
programs, green-energy innovation, or for other societal benefits. 
However: 
Emitters may choose either to pay the tax or to reduce emissions 
[and,] [a]s a result, the level of the tax will likely have to be ad-
justed over time to meet a given emission target. This system 
does, however, provide price certainty, because the tax level is set 
before the policy is implemented.42 
Although carbon taxation seems to be a straightforward ap-
proach to environmental regulation from a public-law perspec-
tive, it can actually take many forms through regional, national, 
and subnational carbon pricing initiatives.43 Price rate changes, 
 
37.  H ARI M. OSOFSKY & LESLEY K. MCALLISTER, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND 
POLICY 35 (2014). 
38.  Id. 
39.  Id. 
40.  See generally Steier, supra note 5. 
41.  OSOFSKY & MCALLISTER, supra note 37, at 35. 
42.  Id. 
43.  RICHARD ZECHTER ET AL., WORLD BANK GRP., STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON 
PRICING 48, 52 (2016), https://perma.cc/AF53-UL8X. 
11
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for instance, target specific sectors, such as: heating fuel in Fin-
land, which was increased by €10 from €44 per tCO2e (US$11 per 
tCO2e) to €54 per tCO2e (US$60 per tCO2e) from 2016; France’s 
carbon tax rate, which increased from €14.5 per tCO2e (US$16 
per tCO2e) to €22 per tCO2e (US$24 per tCO2e) in 2016; and 
Switzerland’s carbon tax, which rose from CHF60 per tCO2e 
(US$62 per tCO2e) to CHF84 per tCO2e (US$86 per tCO2e) in 
2016.44 Similarly, governments may eliminate exemptions, as 
Slovenia did with the removal of the exemption for liquefied pe-
troleum gas and natural gas, with a carbon tax rate of €17 per 
tCO2e (US$19 per tCO2e) now applying to all fossil fuels.45 New 
Zealand, South Africa, China, and California proposed price sta-
bilization mechanisms and carbon offsets for compliance with 
emission targets under Kyoto and Paris.46 These public-law 
strategies have carbon tax underpinnings that strive to reduce 
GHG emissions, disincentivize pollution, and amass funds for en-
vironmental cleanup and green-energy development. 
From a private-law perspective, corporate carbon price re-
porting encourages institutional investors to actively engage 
“with governments on the risks of weak climate policy and the 
need for a carbon price through the Global Investor Statement on 
Climate Change,”47 according to the World Bank. For instance, 
the Global Investor Statement on Climate Change (“GISCC”) was 
signed by 409 investors representing more than US$24 trillion in 
assets to transition to a low-carbon economy and adapt to the 
physical impacts of climate change.48 Minimization of climate 
risk is at the forefront of the GISCC and illustrates the flip side 
to emissions taxation, where those taxed are seeking to exceed 
the bare minimum of government-imposed carbon taxation. Here, 
the proceeds may yield enormous benefits for adaptation and mit-
igation strategies. 
 
44.  Id. at 48. 
45.  Id. at 50. 
46.  See ZECHTER ET AL., supra note 43. See generally Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 
37 I.L.M. 22; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
May 9, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107. 
47.  ZECHTER ET AL., supra note 43, at 55; see ASIA INV’R GRP. ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE ET AL., GLOBAL INVESTOR STATEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2014), 
https://perma.cc/4YQ8-3GQE. 
48. ASIA INV’R GRP. ON CLIMATE CHANGE ET AL., supra note 47, at 1.  
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/5
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With these market realities and trends in globalization in 
mind, applied to the agricultural sector, a carbon tax would disin-
centivize the use of fossil-fuel-based fertilizers and pesticides, and 
may even shorten food chains that escalate food miles, i.e., the 
distances that food is transported from farm to fork. In theory, 
“higher prices generally result in lower consumption”49 of those 
products with the highest emissions, such as GMOs with the 
greatest dependence on fossil fuels for production and processing. 
However, scholars warn that “fertilizer and input suppliers [may] 
bump up the prices they charge farmers to cover their carbon tax 
costs,” while “[f]armers can’t pass these direct and indirect costs 
on,”50 thereby weakening the competitiveness of agricultural 
products. Simply put, commodity crop producers who may have to 
pay a carbon tax will likely be less competitive in the global mar-
ket if their products are priced higher than those of competitors 
who do not pay a carbon tax. This likely consequence of carbon 
taxation in the agricultural sector begs the important question of 
how emissions taxation could be implemented to encourage more 
environmentally friendly farming practices. The following histori-
cal context and comparison of carbon taxation in the EU and the 
U.S. will be instructional in highlighting possible avenues to tax 
emissions for agroecological ideals. 
B. Overview of Carbon Taxation in the European 
Union 
Over the past quarter century, several European countries 
spearheaded carbon taxation models with a clear goal of address-
ing climate change.51 Professor Mikael Skou Andersen from the 
Aarhus University in Denmark and Scientific Committee Vice-
Chair of the European Environment Agency (“EEA”) explains 
that 
 
49.  Kelvin Heppner, Carbon Tax Misses the Mark in Agriculture, 
REALAGRICULTURE (Apr. 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/V7JM-TMEC. 
50.  Id.  
51.  See Mikael Skou Andersen, An Introductory Note on Carbon Taxation in 
Europe: A Vermont Briefing (Dec. 1, 2016) (unpublished conference paper), 
https://perma.cc/Z642-S6G5. 
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[c]arbon taxes are in place in 14 countries in Europe,52 comple-
menting emissions trading schemes for power plants and large 
industrial installations. . . . Carbon taxes have been leveraged by 
linking their introduction to other issues and often through a 
“roundtable” method of policy-making enabling agreement on ex-
emptions and compensations.53 
Professor Skou also notes that “[c]arbon taxes have proven ef-
fective in curbing emissions and, with excise taxes on fuels, pro-
vide a long-term signal capable of transforming energy and 
transport systems.”54 He emphasizes that “[c]arbon tax schemes 
have been designed to reinforce employment and economic activi-
ty and to avoid damaging economic growth.”55 Thus, as previously 
implied, the benefits of carbon taxation go beyond penalizing pol-
lution by making funds available that stimulate green growth 
and redirect funds to adaptation and mitigation strategies. 
1. A Little European Carbon Tax History 
As a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), the EU 
partakes in the international community’s striving towards the 
goals of mitigating and adapting to climate change.56 For in-
stance, in 2000, the EU launched the European Climate Change 
Program (“ECCP”), “including an emission trading program and 
various legislative initiatives to promote renewable energy, ex-
pand the use of biofuel, and improve the energy efficiency of 
buildings.”57 Later, in January 2005, the EU inaugurated the Eu-
ropean Union Emission Trading Scheme (“ETS”). With these 
frameworks in place and by its own account, the EU considers the 
ETS “a cornerstone of the EU’s policy to combat climate change 
and its key tool for reducing greenhouse gas emissions cost-
effectively.”58 In fact, the ETS “is the world’s first major carbon 
 
52.  Id. at 1.  
53.  Id. 
54.  Id. 
55.  Id. 
56.  Kyoto Protocol, EUR-LEX, https://perma.cc/WU7B-W3S2.  
57.  DAVID R. WOOLEY & ELIZABETH M. MORSS, CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO COMPLIANCE § 10:7 (27th ed. 2017). 
58.  Climate Action: The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), EUROPEAN 
COMM’N, https://perma.cc/8AFX-KA7F (last updated Jan. 3, 2018). 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/5
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market and remains the biggest one.”59 It “covers thousands of 
facilities across EU member countries in industries including 
power generation, petroleum refining, coke ovens, and iron and 
steel” whereby “member states set a national cap on CO2 emis-
sions from regulated facilities.”60 The authoritative Clean Air Act 
Handbook explains that “[w]ithin the limits of the national cap, 
governments issued allowances to each installation to emit a cer-
tain level of CO2 annually.”61 Moreover, in 2009, the EU’s frag-
mented national caps were harmonized in a single cap,62 enabling 
facilities to cut cost and emissions and sell any surplus credits,63 
similar to the Kyoto carbon trading scheme. 
Over the past three decades, carbon taxes were implemented 
on a national level in three waves.64 First, around 1990, Nordic 
countries including Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark en-
tered into unilateral commitments under the 1988 Toronto Decla-
ration that coincided with so-called “policies to lower payroll tax-
es to improve economic performance.”65 Specifically, Finland’s 
fossil fuel carbon tax was followed by Sweden’s carbon tax in 1991 
and Denmark’s introduction of a carbon and electricity tax in 
1992.66 Notably, Norway’s policy model has “an almost carbon-
free power sector relying on hydroelectricity,”67 thereby vastly re-
ducing the country’s carbon footprint. The second wave started 
with the Eastern transition countries, Latvia, Slovenia, Estonia, 
Croatia, seeking EU membership since around 2000.68 “A third 
wave of carbon taxes, enacted in Western European countries 
with budgetary challenges (Ireland, Portugal, France) around 
2010, reflected . . . climate policy ambitions.”69 
 
 
59.  Id. 
60.  WOOLEY & MORSS, supra note 57, § 10.7. 
61.  Id.  
62.  Id. 
63.  Id. 
64.  Andersen, supra note 51, at 2.  
65.  Id. 
66.  Id. 
67.  Stefan Speck, Carbon Taxation: Two Decades of Experience and Future 
Prospects, 4 J. CARBON MGMT. 171 (2013). 
68.  Andersen, supra note 51, at 2.  
69.  Id. 
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2. The European Union Emission Trading Scheme 
(“EU ETS”) 
Of special interest for this Article is the EU ETS, especially 
the carbon stocks in the EU territory’s agricultural lands, func-
tioning as carbon sinks toward the overarching goal to reduce 
GHGs. In fact, the European Commission estimates that “the re-
lease of just 0.1% of the carbon currently stored in European soils 
would equal the annual emissions from as much as 100 million 
cars.”70 Emphasizing that the removal, emission, and storage of 
CO2 is of particular importance,71 the European Commission 
notes that agriculture in GHG accounts of industrialized nations 
are governed by Protocol rules for the so-called LULUCF sector—
land-use, land-use change, and forestry.72 Although the EU ETS 
works as a cap-and-trade scheme, it incorporates some carbon 
taxation by promoting robust carbon pricing for investment in 
clean, low-carbon technologies73—the so-called green energy sec-
tor. Operating in 31 countries—i.e., all 28 EU countries plus Ice-
land, Liechtenstein and Norway—the ETS “limits emissions from 
more than 11,000 heavy energy-using installations (power sta-
tions [and] industrial plants) and airlines operating between 
these countries,” which “covers around 45% of the EU’s green-
house gas emissions.”74 As such, the ETS has the potential to live 
up the ideals of carbon taxes by following the polluter-pays model 
and bringing funds to local economies for clean-ups and greening. 
Under the EU-wide ETS cap, companies receive or buy trad-
able emission allowances.75 Between 2013 and 2020, the emis-
sions cap is reduced by 1.74% every year,76 forcing facilities to 
continually lower their emissions or pay a price. As such, the 
“[e]mission allowances are the ‘currency’ of the EU ETS, and the 
 
70.  EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 58. 
71.  Id. (“Removals take place when trees grow or organic material builds up in 
soils. Emissions take place for instance when plants die and decay or when 
soils are disturbed so that their capacity to store is decreased. This would 
be the case when trees or crops are harvested, if wetlands are drained or if 
grasslands are ploughed.”).  
72.  Id. 
73.  Id. 
74.  Id. 
75.  European Comm’n, Climate Action: The EU Emissions Trading System 
(EU ETS) Factsheet, at 1 (2016), https://perma.cc/UW87-ATMP. 
76.  Id. at 2. 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/5
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limit on the total number available gives them a value[,]”77 
whereby the price is subject to supply and demand of the carbon 
market. For example, “[i]n 2015, on average 26 million allowances 
or their derivatives were traded per trading day[, which] . . . add-
ed up to over 6.6 billion allowances or their derivatives, with a to-
tal value of around €49 billion.”78 This, in turn, explains how 
“capping overall greenhouse gas emissions from major sectors of 
the economy . . . creates an incentive for companies to invest in 
technologies that cut emissions.”79 Moreover, “[t]he market price 
of allowances—otherwise known as the ‘carbon price’—creates a 
greater incentive as it increases.”80 Correspondingly, a carbon tax 
reflects the government’s added disincentive to emit GHGs.81 
Figure 2 – How Carbon Taxes Create Incentives to Reduce 
Emissions 
 
77.  Id. (“Each allowance gives the holder the right to emit one tonne of CO2, 
the main greenhouse gas, or the equivalent amount of two other powerful 
greenhouse gases, nitrous oxide (N2O) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs).”). 
78.  Id. at 5. 
79.  Id. 
80.  Id. 
81.  See infra Figure 2. 
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This graph summarizes how the ETS and the workings of the car-
bon market create incentives to reduce emissions (or disincentiviz-
es pollution). Under the ETS, countries set allowances (top left 
funnel) that create the basis for the usage or trade under Kyoto 
principles. Annual emissions cap reductions (middle steps), how-
ever, further shrink the mouth of the funnel, thereby affecting the 
carbon market (bottom inter-linking loops). Overall, the conse-
quences for the carbon market create incentives to reduce emis-
sions (large yellow arrow), which are nuanced in a positive feed-
back loop (top right). 
C. Lacking Behind: US Carbon Taxation To-Date 
“To date, the U.S. Congress has not passed any federal legis-
lation on climate change.”82 Although a carbon tax following the 
EU ETS cap-and-trade model, where the government would allo-
cate emission caps, might be better received than a blanket car-
bon tax, the U.S. has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.83 Commen-
tators usually note that the U.S.’s reluctance in signing the Kyoto 
Protocol is for fear that the obligations to support developing 
countries could be economically harmful or that funding for fed-
eral agencies may be cut to reduce payments under the Proto-
col.84 It is true that 
the United States has participated in international climate 
change discussions, submitting its sixth Climate Action Report in 
2014 as required by the UNFCCC . . . describ[ing] the nation’s 
current circumstances relating to global warming, future trends 
in greenhouse gas emissions, existing and planned policies and 
measures, expected impacts, and other information necessary to 
assess the country’s status with respect to climate change.85 
However, the U.S. did not formally participate in negotiations 
about emissions reduction targets because it is not a party. None-
theless, it released its GHG emissions inventories from the ener-
 
82.  Stephen Sewalk, Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-Trade, 
30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 580, 586 (2013). The author notes that more recent 
sources than 2013 are not available from the Congressional Research Ser-
vice. 
83.  Id. at 602. 
84.  WOOLEY & MORSS, supra note 57, § 10:9. 
85.  Id.  
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/5
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gy, industrial processes, solvents, agriculture, land use change 
and forestry, and waste sectors86—thereby acknowledging its ag-
ricultural carbon footprint. In fact, the U.S. has less than five 
percent of the global population but consumes over one quarter of 
the world’s oil and emits nearly half of global GHGs.87 Food pro-
duction accounts for 20 percent of fossil fuel consumption in the 
U.S.,88 implying that a carbon tax in the agricultural sector could 
significantly raise climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
Industrial farming and the BigAg scheme are particularly 
fertile grounds for effective climate change adaptation and miti-
gation through carbon taxes. American food processing releases 
major air pollutants including sulfur dioxide (“SO2”), carbon mon-
oxide (“CO”), ozone (“O3”), CO2, and nitrogen dioxide (“NO2”).89 
Environmental scholars explain that 
[e]missions from food processing can be classified into three cate-
gories: direct emissions, indirect emissions from purchased elec-
tricity, and other indirect emissions. Direct emissions are from 
sources owned by processors, including boilers, heaters, cookers, 
vehicle fleets, and wastewater treatment. Other key contributors 
to energy use and carbon emissions within the plant include pro-
cessing equipment, like ovens, dehydrators, retorts and pasteur-
izers, coolers and freezers, compressed-air systems, air-handling 
systems, and lighting. Indirect emissions, the second category, 
come from the use of purchased electricity. And finally, the cate-
gory of other indirect emissions includes “emissions that occur as 
a result of food processing activities but from sources not owned 
or controlled by the manufacturer” such as “ingredients, freight, 
equipment manufacture, solid waste disposal, contractor, [and] 
employee business travel.”90 
Thus, the pervasive nature of industrial agriculture is ripe for a 
carbon tax to address BigAg’s impact on climate change where it 
is the most resource-intensive, highest-emitting form of food pro-
duction. Nonetheless, the U.S. may continue to resist entering in-
 
86.  Id. 
87.  Steven Hill, Windmills, Tides, and Solar Besides: The European Way of 
Energy, Transportation, and Low-Carbon Emissions, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10102, 10102–03 (2013). 
88.  ANGELO ET AL., supra note 7, at 115. 
89.  Id. at 123–24. 
90.  Id. at 124. 
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to treaties, such as the Kyoto Protocol, because of its culturally 
rooted tax aversion.91 
Various challenges and obstacles to a carbon tax, such as the 
harmonized European ETS, make it difficult to envision success-
ful implementation in the U.S. The following section outlines 
some of these limitations and proposes strategies to overcome 
them. 
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE IDEA: CHALLENGES OF 
CARBON TAXATION AND OBSTACLES TO 
CARBON-TAXATION IN AGRICULTURE 
A. The Hierarchy of Environmental Law and the 
Question of Power Over Carbon Taxes: A 
Juxtaposition of the EU and US-American 
Approaches 
One major source of friction within food and agriculture law 
is the approval and cultivation of GMOs, as they pose a host of 
environmental risks which accelerate climate change—such as 
expanding fossil-fuel and intensive-type farming.92 Noting agri-
culture’s effects on climate change, this Article focuses on these 
connections.  
In the EU, environmental protection and climate change are 
explicitly articulated goals set forth by the European Parliament. 
The polluter-pays principle is grounded in Art. 192(5) of the Trea-
ty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) (formerly 
Art. 175 of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(“TEC”)).93 Additionally, addressing climate change is a goal 
clearly listed in Article 191(1) of the TFEU (formerly Article 174 
of the TEC).94 As such, the European Parliament insists that the 
 
91.  Ingela Willfors et al., Comm. of Experts on Int’l Cooperation in Tax Mat-
ters, Rep. on Its Fourteenth Session, Carbon Taxation – An Instrument for 
Developing Countries to Raise Revenues and Support National Climate Pol-
icies, U.N. Doc. E/C.18/2017/CRP.6 (Mar. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/A2TF-
MZKE. 
92.  See ANGELO ET AL., supra note 7, at 326. 
93.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 192(5), Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 134, [hereinafter 
TFEU], https://perma.cc/27YR-9CVM.  
94.  Id. art. 191(1). 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/5
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TFEU “be chosen as the legal basis for environmental legislation, 
thereby ensuring that Member States are free to adopt more 
stringent protective measures in accordance with Art. 193 TFEU 
(formerly Art. 176 TEC)”95 This means that legal challenges can 
be brought based on these articles—specifically, climate change 
mitigation disputes may go before the European Court of Justice 
(“ECJ”). 
When challenges are brought, however, the question of juris-
diction arises, because few cases actually reach the ECJ. Germa-
ny’s environmental protection and climate change challenges 
may, for instance, implicate various legal regimes, from the EU to 
the national and state levels.96 
Figure 3 – Levels of Climate Change Laws Applicable in 
Germany. International treaties, such as the Kyoto Protocol (top), 
influence how the EU sets forth its Emissions Trading Directives 
under the ETS. On the national level, the German set of laws, in-
cluding but not limited to the examples listed above, implement 
EU-wide Directives, and may even be more restrictive and protec-
tive of climate and environmental considerations. 
 
In some of these challenges, tensions about the appropriate bal-
ance of power in climate change governance have given rise to 
heated disputes97 and fascinating cases, where “[a]ttempts by the 
European Commission to centralize power in the hands of the EU 
 
95.  Joanne Scott, The Multi-Level Governance of Climate Change, 5 CARBON & 
CLIMATE L. REV. 25, 33 n.2 (2011). 
96.  See infra Figure 3. 
97.  Scott, supra note 95, at 25. 
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have been contested in the courts, by the European Parliament, 
and by [not-for-profit organizations].”98 Section II.B (below) exam-
ines some of these cases and highlights points of comparison to 
similar suits brought in the U.S. 
However, before the comparative analysis begins, the hierar-
chy of environmental and climate change legislation (or the lack 
thereof) must be introduced. As noted above, there is no single 
body of environmental law in the U.S., such as the German Um-
weltschutzgesetz. American environmental scholars maintain 
that, “for the foreseeable future, environmental law will be a law 
about the process of decision rather than a process of evolving de-
cision rules.”99 Complementing these common law principles, sev-
eral environmental statutes provide a regulatory framework for 
environmental litigation in the U.S.:100 
• National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)101 
• Clean Air Act102 
• Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“Clean Water 
Act”)103 
• Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
(“FIFRA”)104 
• Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 
1972 (“Ocean Dumping Act”)105 
• Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)106 
• Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”)107 
• Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (“TSCA”)108 
• Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 
(“RCRA”)109 
 
98.  Id. 
99.  ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, 
AND POLICY 63 (7th ed. 2013). 
100. Id. at 92–94. 
101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2018). 
102. Id. §§ 7401–7671q. 
103. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 (2018). 
104. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2018). 
105. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431–1447f (2018); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1445.  
106. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544.  
107. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-26 (2018). 
108. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2697 (2018). 
109. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k. 
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/5
  
368 Pace Environmental Law Review [Vol. 35 
• Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA” or “Super-
fund”)110 
• Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(“EPCRA”)111 
States may, of course, further regulate various aspects of pollu-
tion and environmental conservation, but most environmental 
disputes touch upon one or more of these statutes.112 U.S. climate 
change policy is undergoing a change under the current admin-
istration, and this author limits the analysis to those aspects per-
tinent to this Article’s argument regarding food and agriculture 
law. 
Food and agriculture law is somewhat a sub-specialty of en-
vironmental law, albeit not exclusively. In the U.S., both food and 
agriculture law, on the one hand, and environmental law, on the 
other, involve the above federal environmental statutes in much 
of their litigation precedent. This overlap is evident in the roles of 
executive agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”), that oversee both environmental conservation and agri-
culture to some extent. The EPA, for instance, announced its 
“Strategy for Agriculture that outlined the agency’s commitment 
to protect the country’s food, water, land, and air for future gen-
erations.”113 This strategy, in other words, implies that sustaina-
ble food production works in conjunction with climate change mit-
igation and adaptation. 
Although EU laws are clearer and more abundant than in 
the U.S., climate change litigation in the U.S. has far outpaced its 
 
110. Id. §§ 9601–9675.  
111. Id. §§ 11001–11050.  
112. Conceding that the standing requirement, see Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (articulating three-pronged standing require-
ment for seeking judicial review of federal agency rules), and the Com-
merce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, see U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, also 
influence environmental litigation, the author notes that a discussion of 
this type is beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, the goal here is to fo-
cus on agriculture and the role of food production without the greater envi-
ronmental and climate change context. Therefore, only a cursory overview 
of the relevant legal frameworks is possible. 
113. MICHAEL T. ROBERTS, FOOD LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 398 (2016).  
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European counterparts.114 “In fact, more lawsuits concerning cli-
mate change have been decided or settled in the U.S. than in the 
rest of the world combined.”115 Scholars note that “the . . . EU 
ETS has generated a substantial portion of non-U.S. litigation 
concerning its requirements and the efforts to comply with 
them.”116 Thus, while in the U.S., “[l]itigation has played a cen-
tral role in driving the course of climate regulation . . . , primarily 
stemming from the landmark 2007 decision of the Supreme Court 
in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency[,]”117 litiga-
tion is certainly a driver of US-American climate change policy. 
Similar to the EPA and USDA in the U.S., the European 
Food Safety Authority (“EFSA”) must also comply with the EU’s 
environmental statutes in considering the approval of GMOs. 
Specifically, in a counterpart to EIS analysis, in the EU, “Envi-
ronmental Risk Assessment (“ERA”) considers the impact on the 
environment caused by, for example, the introduction of GM 
plants, the use of certain substances in food, feed and plant pro-
tection products, or the introduction and spread of plant pests.”118 
Under a host of relevant legislation,119 “EFSA carries out ERA for 
some products authori[z]ed under EU food law, such as pesti-
cides, additives in animal feed, or GM food and feed which may 
involve risks to the environment.”120 However, climate change lit-
igation in the EU is essentially limited to challenges under the 
ETS. 
In Section II.B, this Article introduces the ETS, established 
by Directive 2003/87/EC, as the world’s foremost carbon cap-and-
 
114. Since the Precautionary Principle governs the approval of GMOs in the 
EU, the proliferation and acceptance of GMOs in the EU is substantially 
lower than in the U.S. 
115. MEREDITH WILENSKY, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, COLUMBIA LAW 
SCH., CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE COURTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-U.S. 
CLIMATE LITIGATION i (2015), https://perma.cc/YB6Q-Z5LJ. 
116. Id. at ii. 
117. Id. (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)). 
118. Environmental Risk Assessment, EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY AUTH., 
https://perma.cc/UE2Z-WX2Q. 
119. Id. (“Regulation No 1107/2009 on the placing of plant protection products 
on the market; Regulation No 1831/2003 on additives for use in animal nu-
trition; Directive 2001/18/EC on the deliberate release into the environ-
ment of genetically modified organisms; Regulation No 1829/2003 on ge-
netically modified food and feed.”) 
120. Id. 
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/5
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trade scheme and the basis for carbon taxation in many European 
countries. Scholars note that “while much climate litigation in the 
U.S. is strategic, seeking either to force or to block GHG regula-
tion, climate change litigation elsewhere is primarily tactical, 
aimed at specific projects or details of EU ETS implementa-
tion.”121 The following summarizes some of the pertinent lawsuits 
and the effects they may have on carbon taxation in the agricul-
tural sector. 
B. Legal Challenges of Climate Change Mitigation 
Nowhere in the world has litigation played as big a part in 
climate regulation as in the U.S.122 A common challenge in envi-
ronmental litigation implicating GMOs is the issue of “whether 
the USDA’s APHIS failed to comply with the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (“NEPA”), under which agencies must prepare 
an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) for ‘major federal ac-
tions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment.’”123 In a case where environmental advocacy groups chal-
lenged the USDA’s compliance with NEPA and its  EIS 
provisions, a U.S. federal district court held that “[t]he ESA man-
dates interagency collaboration, through a series of procedural 
requirements outlined in the statute, to effectuate Congress’s 
goals of protecting endangered and threatened plant and animal 
species.”124 Other cases, such as Monstanto v. Geertson Seed 
Farms—where the U.S. Supreme Court reversed APHIS’s na-
tionwide injunction against partial deregulation of Roundup-
ready alfalfa, a GMO125—further support the close links between 
environmental litigation, GMOs, and climate change actions. Pro-
fessor Michael Roberts, a distinguished environmental scholar 
and Founding Executive Director of the Resnick Program 
for Food Law and Policy at UCLA School of Law, states, however, 
that Geertson Seed Farms “ultimately advances a number of val-
ues put forth by the sustainable food movement.”126 Correspond-
 
121. WILENSKY, supra note 115, at ii–iii.  
122. Id. at iii. 
123. ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 427 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2018)). 
124. Ctr. For Food Safety v. Johanns, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172 (D. Haw. 
2006) (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532, 1536 (2018)). 
125. 561 U.S. 139, 158–59 (2010). 
126. ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 427 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
25
  
2018] The Carbon Tax Vacuum 371 
ingly, the sustainable food movement goes hand in hand with 
climate change adaptation and mitigation, thereby illustrating 
how environmental litigation implicating GMOs squarely fits 
within the climate change law framework. 
Most cases challenge the European Commission’s power to 
reject draft National Allocation Plans (“NAPs”) under the sub-
stantially harmonized ETS. For example, in Republic of Poland v. 
Commission of the European Communities, Poland challenged the 
national GHG emissions allocation plan for the period from 2008 
to 2012 in accordance with Directive 2003/87.127 The dispute 
arose from a series of extensions that Poland requested from the 
Commission and the Commission’s conclusion that Poland had in-
fringed on several criteria in Annex III of the Directive.128 Conse-
quently, the Commission “reduced the total annual quantity of 
emission allowances in the NAP by 76.132937 million tonnes of 
CO2 equivalent, fixing the ceiling at 208.515395 million tonnes of 
CO2 equivalent,”129 and Poland contested the decision. This case 
added to the understanding that “[t]he Commission may not in-
tervene except in so far as it considers it necessary to raise objec-
tions to certain aspects of the NAP as notified and, if the Member 
State refuses to amend its NAP, to adopt a decision rejecting the 
plan.”130 At its core, this case illustrates that EU member states’ 
climate actions are strategic but not climate policy trailblazers 
like their US-American counterparts. 
Two notable climate change actions, one from Germany and 
one from the U.S., exemplify the importance of maintaining a hi-
erarchy in power over carbon taxation in environmental law. Alt-
hough these cases are not about food- and agriculture-related is-
sues, they imply them and establish instructive precedent. 
The discrepancies between EU and US-American climate 
change law and policy described above are ultimately linked 
through Air Transport Ass’n of America v. Secretary of State for 
Energy & Climate Change (the Airline case).131 The ECJ affirmed 
Germany’s sovereignty over its airspace in a landmark judgment 
 
127. Case T-183/07, Republic of Poland v. Comm’n, 2009 E.C.R. II-03395. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y of State for Energy & 
Climate Change, 2011 E.C.R. I-13833. 
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where US-American airline emissions affected German air quali-
ty.132 The consideration of Kyoto emissions limitations (as well as 
a host of other treaties and statutes that are beyond the scope of 
this Article) forces even US-American airlines flying over Germa-
ny into ETS compliance.133 As a result of this landmark case, U.S. 
airlines must purchase emissions allowances under the ETS for 
their airplane emissions over Europe. Even though the U.S. is not 
a Kyoto Protocol signatory, it must now comply with ETS rules to 
the extent that its airline businesses affect European airspace. 
Simply put, when American airlines pollute Europe’s skies, they 
must now pay for it. 
Similar principles can be used in food and agriculture policy, 
as much of the industrialized production originates in the U.S. 
and is traded globally. Here, a carbon tax on GMO-dependent 
commodity crops, which require fossil-fuel-intensive processing 
and transportation, might be priced higher, thereby discouraging 
proliferation. Drawing the consequences of the centralization of 
food chains, in light of the existence of multiple foci of industrial 
agriculture in the U.S., gives the EU a foundation to fight back 
and defend its own markets and environments from being over-
powered by the U.S. Such sovereign protection against climate 
change, or the use of the proceeds from such carbon taxes for ad-
aptation and mitigation strategies, gives hope that future genera-
tions can enjoy the environment without suffering the dangers 
that climate science predicts. 
Such protection of future generations’ interests is at issue in 
one of the most progressive climate actions in the U.S. to date. In 
Juliana v. United States, a group of twenty-one young plaintiffs 
(aged eight to nineteen), along with the environmental advocacy 
organization Earth Guardians, and Dr. James Hansen of Colum-
bia University, acting as guardian for future generations, filed 
this action against defendants the United States, President 
Barack Obama, and numerous executive agencies, including the 
EPA, alleging that the defendants “deliberately allow[ed] atmos-
pheric CO2 concentrations to escalate to levels unprecedented in 
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human history.”134 The court agreed that “defendants are respon-
sible for some of the harm caused by climate change and that the 
plaintiffs “may challenge defendants’ climate change policy in 
court,”135 thereby empowering private citizens to use public law 
and private law principles in suits to protect their health from 
climate change. 
Applying these ideas to food and agriculture law, the protec-
tion of health and safety in light of climate change speaks for the 
promotion of agroecology, as noted above. Here, carbon taxation 
may disincentivize the BigAg scheme and make room for sustain-
able agroecologic farming practices that are locally based and col-
lect fewer food miles. In terms of Pacala and Socolow’s Wedges 
model, the shift toward agroecology could be within stabilization 
wedges which would, in turn, be financed with the proceeds from 
carbon taxes on heavy agricultural polluters along the entire food 
chain, from farm to fork. 
Nonetheless, implementation of carbon taxes in the agricul-
tural sector may be prone to industry critique and resistance. Be-
yond the theoretical benefits of expanding the carbon market to 
the agricultural sector are the real limitations of the market. In 
fact, some of the most recognized barriers to establishing an in-
ternational carbon market are: (1) market uncertainty, (2) loss of 
regulatory control, and (3) comparability of effort and prices.136 
The market uncertainty may be attributed to the overall unpre-
dictability of a new carbon taxation scheme, jointly complicating 
the competitiveness of products while relinquishing some regula-
tory control to treaty partners. However, these uncertainties and 
barriers may aid in the stabilization and work like a pendulum 
within the allotted emission allocations. As such, the expansion of 
carbon taxes to the agricultural sector may even have a variety of 
beneficial side effects. 
 
134. Gabriela Steier, No Ordinary Lawsuit: Juliana v. United States sets 
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6:02 PM) (quoting Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d. 1224, 1233 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The scientific consensus on climate change impacts the code-
pendence of agriculture and the environment, and growing eco-
nomic concerns related to climate change all counteract any sup-
posed legal vacuum of a carbon tax. As this Article shows, carbon 
taxes follow the polluter-pays model, levying taxes on the highest 
GHG emissions—and contributions to climate change. Following 
the BAU approach, as Pacala and Socolow illustrate with their 
model of wedges, is not only unsustainable but would undermine 
agricultural production and, thus, food security. In fact, if climate 
change adaptation and mitigation are not supported through car-
bon taxes in the agricultural sector, twenty percent of GHG con-
tributions will be left untouched, jeopardizing the future of U.S. 
food production at the environment’s expense. 
Litigation has established the causal links between GHG 
emissions and climate change. Considering the already-
established connection between food and agriculture law on the 
one hand, and environmental litigation on the other, the loop is 
closed between food, agriculture, climate change, environmental 
protection, and GHG emissions. 
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